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Abstract
There is a large literature pointing to community participation and social
networks as salient components of household well-being in developing settings.
Yet, there are few insights into whether people mobility a⁄ects incentive prob-
lems associated with social networks, or whether labor migration displaces social
informal institutions in village economies at origin. This paper directly tests
the role of international migration in shaping participation in groups and so-
cial networks by migrant sending households in village economies at origin. By
using an original household survey from two southern regions in Mozambique,
we ￿nd that households with successful migrants (i.e. those receiving either
remittances or return migration) engage more in community based social net-
works. Our ￿ndings are robust to alternative de￿nitions of social interaction
and to endogeneity concerns suggesting that stable migration ties and higher
income stability through remittances may decrease participation constraints and
increase household commitment in cooperative arrangements in migrant-sending
communities.
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11 Introduction
Social capital and networks are increasingly receiving attention from economists, on
both a theoretical and an empirical ground, in that a key source of information and re-
sources, ultimately in￿ uencing economic performance (Bala and Goyal 2000, Durlauf
and Fachamps 2005). A growing body of research suggests that social interactions
yield signi￿cant economic returns by facilitating cooperation and enabling individuals
to bene￿t from trade when commitment is not possible (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988;
Narayan and Pritchett, 1999; Putnam, 1993). This is particularly true in developing
economies where institutional or market failures make membership in community or-
ganizations and social networks crucial for exchanging goods and services, accessing
to credit and sharing risk (see Besley 1995; Foster and Rosenzweig 1996; Fafchamps
2005, Fafchamps and Lund 2003; Udry, 2005). A common perception in this literature
is that social capital is place-speci￿c as it develops in essentially immobile settings
and is hampered by geographic mobility and distance (Glasear et al. 2000 and 2008,
Schi⁄, 2002).1 Yet, labor migration of household members is a common livelihood
strategy in many developing societies, but little is known on the extent to which peo-
ple mobility and remittances a⁄ects household incentive problems associated with
community participation, or whether migration displaces inter-household arrange-
ments in village economies at origin. This paper aims at ￿lling this gap by directly
testing the role of migration in shaping household participation in social networks
in source communities in Southern Mozambique, where informal social arrangements
are vital and migration ￿ ows - typically to South Africa - are substantial. By ana-
lyzing a rich set of social interaction measures, including participation in groups and
mutual informal cooperation between households, our ￿ndings show that successful
migration and remittances may signi￿cantly reduce the potential loss of social capital
and cohesion associated with labor out-￿ ows in source communities.
There is a growing literature that documents the importance of labor migration
and remittances for living conditions of households and village economies in many
developing contexts. In particular migration, either on a temporary or a permanent
basis, has been recognized as a familial arrangement with bene￿ts in terms of risk-
diversi￿cation, income smoothing and investment ￿nancing, whereby remittances are
a central element of such household strategy (Stark, 1991, Lucas, 1987; Rozelle et
al., 1999; Yang, 2006). There are di⁄erent mechanisms, related to information and
resource ￿ ows, through which household labor mobility may a⁄ect social networks.
1We use the terms social networks, informal institutions, inter-household cooperation and social
capital as synonymous. This is a catchall for all those social arrangements that make relatively little
use of formal contractual obligations enforced through codi￿ed legal system and that operate as a
￿ network￿in which individuals are connected to other people (Ellsworth 1989). It is worth noting
that all these measures are positively correlated and, in particular, membership in community groups
is always conceived as positively associated with the probability of interpersonal network formation
(see for example Barr and Genicot, 2008 for empirical evidence)
2On the one hand, migration is presumed to weakean social ties and cohesion by
withdrawing human capital and raising the cost of establishing and mainteining so-
cial relationships in the community left behind. This is so as mobility drives down
social capital returns (Glaeser, et al. 2000), impedes monitoring and enforcement
(Fafchamps and Gubert 2005, Miguel et al.2006) and, by raising income through re-
mittances, may make social sanctions less e⁄ective (Ligon et al. 2000). This is to say
that out-migration may reduce social capital formation by making migrant-sending
households less dependent on community membership and social ties. On the other
hand, though, while group membership and social arrangements serve many impor-
tant economic functions for households￿subsistence and well-being in poor settings,
they also draws costs or obligations as contribution is expected from each network
member (Miguel et al. 2006, La Ferrara 2000). Thus, successful migration (e.g. re-
mittances) may decrese participation costs in the community at origin. Furthermore,
households with migrant members may be more appealing partners for network re-
lationships in the community at origin by increasing the scope of risk-diversi￿cation
through informal mutual arrangements (Munshi 2003, Winters et. 2001). This is
so as, when aggregated income is risky and self-enforcing impediments (e.g. lim-
ited commitment) to informal arrangements are binding, stable remittances received
from migrants may help relax such constraints and increase the probability of joining
(Ligon et al. 2001). Overall, the ￿ social impact￿of migration is theoretically ambiguos
but little evidence exists in shedding light on this issue.
Based on an original household survey collected by the authors in two regions in
the south of Mozambique, this paper considers this question by directly investigating
the e⁄ect of family migration exposure on household incentives to join economic
groups and mutual arrangements in communities at origin. In order to account
for the multi-faceted nature of social capital and to better understand the role of
migration in shaping the whole spectrum of community based informal cooperation,
we distinguish between participation in (formal) groups that provide some shared
economic bene￿ts and (informal) mutual arrangements with important persons and
neighbours in the community (see Miguel at al. 2006). Overall our ￿ndings are robust
to alternative de￿nitions of social interaction and show that, while family labor out-
migration may decrease social capital in households left behind, remittance receipt,
as well as return migration, plays a statistically signi￿cant and economically relevant
role in increasing the household probability of joining community groups and social
networks at origin. We interpret these results as evidence that stable migration ties
or higher income stability through remittances may decrease participation costs and
increase household committment in informal social arrangements in migrant sending
communities. Results are robust to the introduction of a number of community-level
control variables and ￿xed e⁄ects, and to potential endogeneity or reverse causation
issues, which we address with an instrumental-variable estimation strategy.
3Furthermore, in order to explore the role of the institutional context on migrant
household voluntary participation in community groups, we carry out a sensitivity
analysis of results across socio-economic heterogeneous communities, according to ob-
servable attributes correlated with household cooperative behavior, i.e. institutional
development (e.g. land market), economic inequality, ethnic and religious fragmen-
tation. Overall, our ￿ndings suggest that migrant-sending households in Southern
Mozambique are more likely to engage in social capital investment and cooperation
in more economically even societies, where social sanctions may be more e⁄ective,
whilst they are not unevenly responsive to the social composition of the community
in terms of ethnicity or religion.
Our results contribute to the existing migration literature by providing new in-
sights into how labor mobility, as a key component of a development process, a⁄ect
social networks and institutions in the community at origin. To the best of our
knowledge, this paper represents the ￿rst study that attempts to provide system-
atic evidence on this issue, which has important implications for future research
on the degree to which migration may generate positive externalities at community
level. While our analysis is tailored to the speci￿c context of Southern Mozambique,
￿ndings have broader relevant implications if considering the growing temporary or
circular nature of cross-border migration ￿ ows in di⁄erent parts of the world and
the enduring ties that current migrants maintain with their home communities. By
exploring this issue, this paper also contributes to a burgeoning literature aiming
at better understanding the determinants and mechanims underlying the formation
(or destruction) of social networks and institutions in modern societies (Barr and
Genicot, 2008, Fafchamps and Gubert 2005, Fafchamps and Lund, 2005, La Ferrara
2000).
From a policy perspective, exploring migrants￿contribution to social capital in-
vestment in communities at origin contributes in shedding light on one of the most im-
portant component of economic growth and development. Since Granovetter (1985),
Coleman (1988) and Putnam (2000) seminal studies, social networks have long been
shown to play an important role in building trust and generating e¢ cient allocation
of resources in both developed and developing economies (see also Glaeser, et al.
2000 and Guiso et al. 2004). This is even more relevant if the lack of trust and social
capital deter individuals to acquire capital even when investment opportunities are
strong, thereby generating ine¢ ciency or poverty traps (Karlan et al. 2009, Glaeser,
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman 2003).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the theoreti-
cal background and institutional context. Section 3 presents the original hosuehold
survey data and descriptive statistcs. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy and
Section 5 presents results. Section 6 concludes.
42 Theoretical background and context
Labor out-migration, either domestic or abroad, is an important route out of poverty
for many developing societies (Adams and Page, 2005, Yang 2006, 2008 among oth-
ers). There are several mechanisms through which international migration and re-
mittances translate into important economic improvements in source communities,
and much of the focus has been put on investment in physical and human capital by
migrant-sending households left behind (e.g. Cox and Ureta, 2003, Mendola 2008).
Yet, social capital in general, and group participation and networks more speci￿cally,
are an important component of village economies in developing countries, but lit-
tle is known on the e⁄ect of household migration status in shaping inter-household
exchanges in communities left behind.2
The common wisdom is that migration threatens the social structure and the
organisation of the common duties in local communities at origin, by increasing in-
formation asymmetries and imperfect monitoring (Besley et al. 1993, Fafchamps and
Gubert 2007, Miguel et al. 2006) and withdrawing human and labor resources from
the household left behind.3. Moreover, having a migrant member working abroad
has been regarded as a within-family income diversi￿cation strategy so that insur-
ance may be achieved within the family and the incentive to participate in reciprocal
insurance arrangements with non-family community members may lower (see Ligon
et al. 2002).4
However, group participation and social capital in low-income settings are not
only a ￿ side social activity￿but serve many functions that elsewhere (e.g. in developed
countries) are served by market mechanisms and formal institutions (e.g. informal
insurance, credit access, employment, production opportunities etc.) (La Ferrara,
2000, Fafchamps 2005). Di⁄erently said, joining informal social networks improves
economic e¢ ciency by reducing information and enforcement problems when mar-
kets are weak or missing5. This is also in line with the original perception of social
2Social capital has a wide and variable de￿nition in the literature, e.g. generalized trust; con￿dence
in institutions, social network (social relationship and group membership), political participation,
civic awareness and social norms (see Putnam et al. 1993, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, Helliwell
2001, Sabatini 2005, and Durlauf and Fafchamps 2005, for the principal di⁄erences on the de￿nition
and measures of social capital).
3Futhermore, when migration is coiceived as an individual strategy, it reduces the probability
of trading with the same person in the future and reciprocity becomes less enforceable. This is to
say that risk-sharing contracts become more "spot contracts", in which commitment is unfeasible
(Routledge and von Amsberg, 2003).
4The insurance motives for migration have been emphasised by the New Economics of Labour
Migration (NELM), according to which greater income uncertainty may encourage out migration as a
risk diversi￿cation strategy (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Katz and Stark, 1986). Moreover, remittances
received from migrant members represent a potential means to overcome credit constraints for source
households (Lucas, 1987; Stark, 1991).
5The social capital networks we refer to (which provide mutual assistance between households)
are informal in the sense that they take place outside of the market place and are made without any
legal arrangement that could in any way be binding. They are not closed multilateral grouping based
on well-de￿ned formal associations that have written rules or regulations governing their operation,
5capital as, recalling Putnam et al. (1993), it "refers to features of social organiza-
tion, such as trust, norms, and networks, that can improve the e¢ ciency of society
by facilitating coordinated actions". Hence, it may be the case that only households
that are part of a connected social network will be able to experience migration
and reap gains from migrants￿ s remittances. This is to say that in a probabilistic
migration framework the ex-ante incentive to join community associations may be
large.6 At the same time, even though social networks are open, there are frictions in
participation that may arise because of convex transactions costs, imperfect commit-
ment, asymmetric information, lack of enforceability or any other process that limits
informal exchange (Fafchamps, 2002, Ligon, Thomas and Worral, 2002). Thus, suc-
cessful migration, mostly embodied by stable remittances receipt, may both relax
incentive constraints and increase the likelihood that other households will want to
enter cooperative arrangements with migrant-sending households, therby increasing
social networks participation (Winters et al 2001, Davis et al 2002, Munshi 2003).
Indeed, households with a more stable income entry can expect to be able to commit
themselves more easily to regular payments in informal exchanges. Moreover, certain
informal groups may be more inclined to accept members that have a regular and
secure source of income Thus income stability, through lower risk of default, may
have a positive impact on the probability to join a group.
These ideas have a long-standing theoretical foundation in the literatures on
collective action and social network formation. Informal private transfers through
networks and mutual arrangements between households have been modelled as self-
enforcing contracts (i.e. based on voluntary participation), where current generosity
is justi￿ed by expected future reciprocity (Kimball, 1988; Foster, 1988; Coate and
Ravallion, 1993; Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001).7 This is so as (full) informal in-
surance arrangements are potentially limited by the presence of various incentive
constraints, with the lack of commitment receving particular attentions (Ligon et al.
2001, Dubois et al. 2008).8 Accordingly, numerous empirical studies have shown that
mutual informal arrangements do not work at village level but within sub-groups in
a community and even among speci￿c individuals within a group (e.g. Udry, 1994;
Towsend, 1994, Fafchamps and Lund, 2003). This is to say that households decide
though. Hardship and risk are often di¢ cult to face individually. Thus people voluntarily participate
into such arrangements which are sustained over time as they o⁄er higher expected payo⁄ than the
one in autarky.
6We further add on this by considering that if social networks has an additional e⁄ect in fostering
migration, the ex ante incentive to participate in social networks may be even larger if families expect
net bene￿ts of their migration strategies. This mechanism is related to the recent contributions on
the "Brain drain" vs "Brain gain" debate (see Docquier and Rapopport, 2008).
7By allowing mutual help to be history-dependent, informal insurance arrangements are consistent
with models of ￿ quasi-credit￿where enforcement constraints limit gift giving (e.g. Kokerlakota, 1996;
Ligon, Thomas and Worrall, 2001; Fafchamps, 1999).
8Liquidity constraints may be thought as a ￿ reduced form￿expression for market imperfections
resulting from informational problems, such as adverse selection and moral hazard, and the lack of
enforcability.
6to share inputs, services, risk and more generally ￿ mutual help￿through networks of
friends and relatives, whereby some form of compensation is involved - in terms of
time, money or labor contributions - against the attainment of individual and collec-
tive bene￿ts (see also De Weerdt, 2002, Dekker, 2003, Narayan, 1997).9 Thus, the
e⁄ect of family members￿out-migration and remittances on household incentive to
cooperate and join community groups that provide some shared (economic) bene￿ts
in not unambigous a priori.
At the same time, it is important to note that there may be di⁄erent motivations
behind incentives to cooperate of migrant-sending households related to community
level institutions and heterogeneity . Households￿propensity to engage in informal
social arrengements may, for example, be mitigated when there are other (formal)
ways to exchange goods and services or if socio-economic heterogeneity (or con￿ icts)
at community level undermines trust and cooperation (Kranton, 1996 and Alesina
and La Ferrara, 2000). In particular, the economic and antrophological literature has
emphasised that both extrinsic incentives, e.g. (social) sanctions that can credibly
threatened, and intrinsic motivations, such as altruism, inequality aversion and recip-
rocal kindness, can act as bases for commitment (Platteau, 1994, 1996; Fafchamps,
1992 1996, Posner and Rasmusen, 1999).10
We use an original and unusually detailed survey data on household migration
and social interactions from Southern Mozambique to document how these factors
interplay with each other. According to the literature, we focus on one of the most
important component of social capital, that is participation in di⁄erent groups that
provide economic bene￿ts in terms of information sharing and the production of
collective goods (La Ferrara, 2000).11 Yet, owing to its comprehensive or intangible
character, we also consider other forms of social capital, such as informal exchanges
of goods and services with important persons or neighbours in the community.12 In
both cases, though, we focus on the economic bene￿ts of group membership and
informal interaction, as opposed to more intangible psychological and social bene￿ts
9Indeed, pure altruistic motivations behind informal insurance arrangements at network level are
ruled out by various and ￿ sophisticated￿ (e.g. contingent) contractual forms that can take place
within limited market opportunities for risk-sharing (e.g. grain transfers, labour assistance, land
access, quasi-credit etc.) (see Fafchamps, 1992; Platteau, 1991).
10Anderson and Baland (2002) provide evidence that individuals living in Kenyan slums put money
in rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) to avoid claims on their resources by spouse and
relatives. Ambec (1998) and Banerjee and Mullainathan (2007) take these observations as starting
point to model the saving behavior of poor households.
11The character of a group is double-fold: it is a collective actor that performs in its own right,
ful￿ls task in society and eventually provide public goods to members (Putnam et al., 1993). But it
is also built on the willingness of individual actors who work together on shared objecives and norms
(Coleman, 1990).
12It is worth noting that scholars agree that, even in developing and poor settings, objective and
visible networks, such as group membership, are more institutionalised than informal interaction
patterrns. Yet both refer to the ￿ structural social capital￿ , compared to the ￿ cognitive social capital￿
that includes norms, trust, attitudes and subjective beliefs (Grootaert et al, 2004, Uphoof and
Wijayaratna, 2000).
7of social capital.
2.1 The Mozambican context
Mozambique is an interesting testing ground where to study the impact of labor mi-
gration on the creation (or destruction) of social capital in village economies left be-
hind. Compared with other countries in Southern Africa, social networks in Mozam-
bique are unique as a result of various factors. People predominatly organise their
social life around their kin, which may provide social protection, as social services
(e.g. health, child care, pensions) are rarely in place (Ministerio do Plano e Financas,
1998). Though, due to a low population density, settlement patterns are scattered
and households do not necessarly live in ￿ villages￿but often are long distances from
each other.13 In addition, social ties within the communities were largely destroyed
during the armed internal war (1984-1992), which displaced about 50 per cent of the
population. The massive return of refugees and displaced persons in the 1990s was
even more problematic as in many cases, refugees and internally displaced people had
been away from their villages for ten or ￿fteen years, and their dwelling and agricul-
tural plots had been occupied by other displaced people.14 Thus, many systems of
informal cooperation and structure of rural socieity were destroyed, while new forms
of reciprocal exchange and insurance arrangements arose at community level, as di-
versi￿cation of social relations became of growing importance. This is so as, despite
the fact that Mozambique￿ s economy has registered some positive ￿gures with respect
to economic achievements over the last 16 years (the average annual GDP growth rate
increased to 7% during the 1990s), it became incresingly hard for the extended family
and traditional rural society to cope with new distresses such as HIV/AIDS, orphans,
natural disasters and signi￿cant out-migraiton ￿ ows, both rural-urban and to South
Africa. The latter is Africa￿ s economic superpower, and has been the destination of
substantial regional migration ￿ ows throughout its history, with Mozambican consti-
tuting at least one third of the immigrant workforce, followed by immigrants from
13Mozambique is a country of about 800,000 square kilometers, almost half the size of Mexico,
that has to support a population of only 15 million.
14The war began shortly after independence in Mozambique in 1975 and had been going on for
almost 20 years. So this was a protracted, bloody war where the Frelimo Government that came to
power in independence was being pressured by its neighbors, ￿rst by Rhodesia and then by South
Africa, to give up their Socialist views.It was in fact a point of contact of the superpowers during
the cold war.The peace agreement that ended the war was signed on October 4, 1992 in Rome.
The UNHCR reports about 5 million displaced people and refugees as a result of this war￿ 1.5, 1.7
million refugees who were in camps in these neighboring countries (primarily Malawi, Tanzania,
Zimbabwe, to a lesser extent Zambia, South Africa, and Swaziland), and 3.5 million or so internally
displaced throughout the entire country. In the same period the country experienced a long dry
period that resulted in people￿ s displacement. Of those returning home after being displaced from
their homelands for 10, 15, even 20 years, the UNHCR repatriated about 600,000 or 700,000. The
other almost million-and-some spontaneously came back from the neighboring countries that border
Mozambique, mostly found their hometowns, dwellings and neighbours vanished and resettled where
possible (Raimundo, 2009).
8Lesotho and Zimbabwe.15 Yet, despite the strong linkages between the Mozambican
and South African labor markets, very little systematic evidence exists on migration
waves and consequences in the area.
According to preliminary estimates, over 200.000 Mozambicans work in South
Africa (SAMP: Migration News, 01/03/2003), with a great impact on the Mozambi-
can development pattern, especially in southern rural regions. Yet, Mozambique still
remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with 35 percent of its population
living below the poverty line (and 70 percent living below the extreme poverty line)
(PRSP, 2006) and with social networks among community members representing key
informal safety nets to cope with poverty. The main types of informal co-operation
between households include xtique (credit and saving), ajuda mutua (mutual assi-
tance in daily work) and buscato or ganho-ganho (exchange of labor, money, food,
or tradtional drinks) (Marsh 2003). Formal cooperation is comparately less di⁄used,
even though with the increased NGO and ￿ aid related￿activities over the last two
decades, a growing number of institutional groups and associations are emerging all
over the country. Strengtening social capital and community-based assocations is in-
creasingly recognised as an essential relay for development assistance, and it has been
identi￿ed as an important way to respond to some of the major Mozambican chal-
lenges by many donors in the development debate (G20, 2005, PRSP, 2006). Thus,
given the relevance of both labor migration and community-based social networks in
the Mozambican economy, it is of interest to understand how these phenomena are
related, shedding light on the broader under-researched question about households￿
motives to join groups and nonmarket arrangements in communities with access to
an external source of resources i.e. labor out-migration and remittances.
3 The Data
The empirical analysis is based on a household survey of 1002 households from 42 com-
munities (both urban and rural) in 4 districts (Manhica, Magude, Chokwe￿ , Chibuto)
of 2 regions (Maputo and Gaza) in southern Mozambique, conducted by the authors
in Summer 2008 (see Map in Appendix). Sample households have been selected with
a probability proportional to population size estimated from the most recent 2007
15South Africa has been the destination of substantial migration ￿ ows since the colonial period.
Male labor migration to the mines and commercial farms from almost every other country in the
region (especially modern-day Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe) was the most enduring form
of legal cross-border labor migration. Signi￿cant poverty and unemployment rates in source coun-
tries have pushed also undocumented migrants to cross the border with South Africa. The end of
the apartheid in the early 90s and the ensuing integration of South Africa in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC) produced new opportunities for cross-border mobility and new in-
centives for temporary migration.While Lesotho￿ s geographical land-locked position and Zimbabwe￿ s
economic and political implosion constitutes special cases of migration and displacment in the region,
Mozambique o⁄ers an appropriate setting for studying charateristics and consequences of modern
migration ￿ ows in the region.
9General Population Census data provided by the Mozambican National Statistical
Institute (INE) so that the household survey is rapresentative at the regional level.16
The survey collected detailed information on demographic characteristics of house-
hold members, migration status, household asset endowment, farm and non-farm
occupations of the household head and household social capital and network par-
ticipation. With respect to the latter, information on several dimensions of social
interaction outside of the family was collected, in particular (i) wheather any house-
hold member participates in various types of community groups, both economic and
socio-political, including chacteristics of group membership (i.e. as bene￿ciary or
promoter/decision maker), (ii) whether the household is in contact with relevant
persons in the community (i.e. traditional commuity leader, elected village chief,
school teacher, doctor/￿ curandeiro￿ , agricultural agent, neighbours) and which type
of exchange or ￿ mutual help￿ (if any) is in place with them. In particular information
include whether households give or receive (or both) any good or services with each
of their network partner.
Data on migration of household members was also gathered, including migrants￿
characterstics, duration and destination of migration, and whether migration involved
moving costs and remittances. In addition, a community questionnaire was imple-
mented to the community leader in oder to collect information on the institutional
and market organization, community infrastructure and social cohesion.
In this section some descriptive statistics from the Mozambican survey will be
presented as to gain some insights into the di⁄usion and characteristics of household
migration and social interactions in our sample (sampling population weights are
always used as to provide regionally representative ￿gures). Table 1 reports sample
characteristics related to international migration experience in the household. Data
show that 55 percent of households in the sample are ￿ migrant hosueholds￿ , i.e. at
least one household member has migrated abroad at least once (38 percent report
having current migrant members, the remaining households had migrants in the past)
and overall, the average number of migrants per household is 1.6. Among current
migrant-sending households, 60 percent receive remittances from migrants.
-Table 1 about here-
If we look at individual level characteristics of migrant and non-migrant household
members, 12 percent of our sample individuals are currently working away from
16In each of the selected communities, the population has been canvassed prior to the begin-
ning of the survey to identify two groups of households, i.e. thos with at least one international
migrant currently abroad, and those with no migrants. The target number of households has be
drawn randomly from each of the two subgroups, in the same proportion as the actual migra-
tion rate. The original survey contains information on 1002 households, but some speci￿c infor-
mation about migrants are missing in some households so that we end up with a sample of 905
households in our empirical analysis. A mroe detailed description of the survey can be found at
http://dipeco.economia.unimib.it/persone/mendola/moza.htm
10home, whilst 6 percent are return migrants- in both cases more than 90 per cent
of them migrate to South Africa. Table 2 reports individual level characteristcs
of past/return migrants and current international migrants (information about the
latter are collected through a proxy respondent). Return migrants are predominantly
men, in their working age, more married and educated than stayers. The same is
true for household members currently working abroad, but di⁄erences are even more
striking. Returnees migrated to work, typically to South Africa, the average duration
of migration is a bit less than one year, and the reason for return has to do mainly
with family, and with the end of job or vacation (indeed 58 percent of returnees report
to intend to leave again in the future). Also current migrants go abroad for work, 80
per cent of migration episodes are reported to be temporary and main occupations
are miner, unskilled worker, informal trader. Both current and past migrants report
that help to migrate came from their own family (either in Mozambique or abroad) or
from their own previous experience. Migrants also report to cover costs of migration
typically through their own resources or through relatives (either in Mozambique or
abroad). Households report that current migrants return mostly once per year and
45 per cent of them send remittances home. Among current migrants, 55 percent
send home remittances on a regular basis, mainly in person or through friends and
collegues, and the money is reported to be spent mostly for primary consumption
needs as food, clothing and housing (see Table 3).
-Table 2 about here-
-Table 3 about here-
Table 4 presents the incidence and characteristics of household participation in
groups and social arrangements. In our sample 27 percent of households are member
of some group whilst almost all of them are in contact, and 74 percent daily talk, with
at least one important person in the community (this is true even excluding neigh-
bours from the list of important persons). Yet, not all of them exchange something
with them or expect mutual help with key persons and neighbours in the community,
as only 27 percent give or receive goods or services from them.17
-Table 4 about here-
We use this information as a proxy for di⁄erent forms of social networks. It has
been claimed that social capital may be measured by participation in ￿ institution-
alised￿community groups or associations, which may di⁄er from informal contacts or
arrengments with neighbours or friends (Durlauf and Fafchamps, 2005, Miguel et al.
17The actual survey questions on this are: ￿ In the last 30 days, did you or someone in your family
give any money, gift or services with [each important person]?￿and ￿ In the last 30 days, did you or
someone in your family receive any money, gift or services from [each important person]?￿
112006). We argue that our measures of social capital, i.e. group membership and con-
tact with important persons in the community are good proxies for social networks
participation.We also collected information on the reason why households do not join
a group or get in contact with important persons (we ask this for each group and for
each key person in the community). Tables 5 sheds light on household￿ s subjective
perception of the costs and bene￿ts of group participation and social networks at
village level. The table lists the main reason why households chose not to join a
group or to get in contact with important persons. The answers related to group
participation show that the most frequent reason is the lack of money, followed by
lack of time and lack of interest; as important persons are concerned, the main reason
is lack of interest, followed by lack of time and lack of money. This is in line with
the idea outlined above about the di⁄erent degree of formality of ￿ institutionalised￿
groups and ￿ informal￿social arrangements in the community.
-Table 5 about here-
Table 6 presents hosuehold characteristics by migration status and network type.
Overall, households belonging to community groups seem to be better o⁄with respect
to some indicator of physical and human capital. This is consistent with the idea that
group members tend to sort into homogeneous pool of persons with respect to some
characteristics such as income, human capital, ethinicity etc. (La Ferrara, 2000).
This is less true with respect to informal social networks (here measured through an
indicator whether hosueholds engage in mutual help or spend in social cerminonies),
which show a less systematic pattern with respect to standard socio-economic vari-
ables (Panel A). Interestingly, though, while households with international migration
experience and remittances appear not to be particularly concentrated in either for-
mal or informal social networks (Panel A), households receiving remittances or return
migration engage signi￿cantly more in both networks (Panel B).18
-Table 6 about here-
Yet, given the concurrent e⁄ect of household characteristics and migration on
social capital, descriptive statistics is not fully explanatory in this regard and a mul-
tivariate analysis is required.
4 Empirical analysis design
We start by estimating a model that relates the household decision to participate
in social networks to household attributes, including migration and remittances, and
18This is also true with respect to remittances, i.e. 41 per cent of households joining community
groups (39 per cent of households with informal netowks) report to receive remittances, against 23
per cent (21 percent) of houeholds with no group membership (social networks).
12community-level characteristics. The social capital literature agrees on considering
the family as the primary unit of analysis and we specify the expected net bene￿t
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where M and R are respectively the number of migrants in the household and whether
the household receives remittances from them19, and X and H are vectors of house-
hold and community characteristics respectively (such as demographics, education,
wealth, residence). "i;j is the standar error term. The parameters of interest are ￿1;
which captures the e⁄ect of sending one unit of household labor to work abroad and
￿2; representing the e⁄ect of receiving remmittances on household incentive to join
a group. What we observe, though, is not the latent variable B but only the choice
made by the household that takes value 1 (participation) if the expected net bene￿t
is positive, and 0 (no participation) otherwise:
Pi;j = 1 if Bi;j > 0 (2)
Pi;j = 0 if Bi;j < 0
We estimate the model above with both a linear and a probit model. Our main
dependent variable is whether households participate in any (formal) group. Yet,
we also use other cooperative outcomes such as measure of household engagment
in informal networks of ￿ mutal bene￿t￿or ￿ ganho-ganho￿and whether the household
incurred in social expenses for cerimonies or funerals out of the family.
A potential concern with the above estimation strategy, though, is that migration
and remittances may su⁄er from potential endogeneity and simultaneity bias. This
is so as households are likely to self-select into sending migrants abroad based on
unobserved characteristics, including ex ante social network participation. Indeed,
a major ￿nding in the migration literature is that social networks, in particular mi-
grants established at destination and return migrants, can serve as a source of job in-
formation and help for subsequent migrants arriving from the same origin community
(Massey at al. 1993, Munshi, 2003).20 Thus if social networks increase the household
migration prospectus, reduced form estimates could be biased upward. Moreover, re-
19Including the level of remittances as explanatory variable would be ideal, but the quality of
the information collected is not enough to include it as a continuous vairable. From other related
information we are aware of the fact that remittances are mainly in-kind and sent through informal
channels, like friends, relatives or returnees- quantifying them resulted a particularly di¢ cult task
for interviewed households. See Table 3 in descriptive statistics.
20Yet, as already noted above, both current and past migrants in our sample households report
to receive help for migration from their own family (either in Mozambique or abroad) or from their
own previous experience. Similiarly, migrant sending households report to cover costs of migration
through their own resources or through relatives (either in Mozambique or abroad). Therefore it
seems that family networks are more important and relevant than social networks in migration
behavior.
13mittances are produced by allocating family members to labor migration, and given
migration, they are simultaneously shaped by many of the same characteristics that
a⁄ect household social capital investment (Taylor and Martin, 2001). To account
for this possibility, we estimate a recursive system of linear probabiliy models and
instrument both migration and remittances using exogenous instrumental variables.






Mi;j = ￿0Xi;j + @0Zi;j + ￿i;j (3)
Ri;j = ￿0Xi;j + @0Wi;j + ￿i;j
where Z and W are the instuments for migration and remittances respectively. The
model above constitute a recursive system where both migration and remittances are
endogenously determined with social capital. Migration, M is a fuction of individ-
ual and household level characteristics, especially related to human-capital variables.
Given migration, motivations to remit, R, are complex . In addition to human cap-
ital variables, they may be in￿ uenced by expected norms in the source village and
by household￿ s need for insurance (see Lucas and Stark, 1985, Yang and Choi 2006).
The identi￿cation of the model depends on ￿nding instrumental variables Z and W
that a⁄ect social capital solely through their impact on migration and remittances
choices. The stochastic terms ";￿ and ￿ are assumed to be normally and indepen-
dently distributed with variance ￿2
;j: However, from the set up it is likely that there
is cross-equation correlation, since all three activities may be subject to the same ex-
ogenous shocks. To account for contemporaneous correlation, we estimate the model
using a recursive three-stage least squares (for comparison purposes, we also use a
two-stage approach).
In order to further explore the role of migration coupled with remittances as
a comittment device in group participation, we address some issues related to the
￿ direction￿of social interaction, i.e. whether migrant-sending households give or re-
ceive relatively more in inter-household exchanges. In addition, in the last part of
our empirical analysis, we further estimate group participation for socio-economic
homogenous and heterogenous communities separately as to check the robustness of
migration and remittances￿coe¢ cients across subsample populations (i.e. institu-
tional enviroments).
5 Regression results
Table 7 reports our baseline estimates from the reduced form linear probability model,
where the dependent variable is a bynary indicator equal to 1 if the household par-
14ticipate in at least one group in the community (basic statistics of main indipendent
variables are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix). Following the existing evidence
on the determinants of group and social networks participation, the variables X and
H are household demographic, human- and physical-capital variables and community
level controls. Household characteristics include: age, sex and education of house-
hold head, household size and demographic characteristics, ethnicity and religion,
household residence and occupation. Household wealth is measured through an ￿ syn-
thetic asset index￿weighting the ownership of various durable goods and the dwelling
conditions.21 We futher include community level characteristics, such as the quality
of roads, school, health facilities, formal bank and market availability. We ￿nally
include community ￿xed e⁄ects (where the community is our primary sampling unit)
as to fully focus on the within-community variation only.
-Table 7 about here-
Column 1 in Table 7 shows that the direct e⁄ect of the household number of
migrants on group participation is negative, whilst access to capital through remit-
tance receipt is signi￿cantly and positively associated with social capital investment.
These results are more precisely estimated with the inclusion of a large set of house-
hold level characteristics and community attributes (column 2). Household decision
to join a group signi￿cantly decreases by 5 percentage points as each family members
leaves the household to work abroad. Yet, there is a signi￿cant o⁄setting e⁄ect of
receving remittances, that increases the probability to participate by 18 percentage
points (see Probit marginal e⁄ects in Table A.2 in the Appendix). As far as con-
trols are concerned, demographic household characteristics have the expected sign,
including the negative relation between the number of women in the household and
the likelyhood to join groups. This is due to the strongly patriarchal structure of the
mozambican society, particularly in the South of the country, and to the low ￿ voice￿
of mozambican women in many di⁄erent aspects of their socio-economic life. Belong-
ing to ethnic minorities, instead, or having traditional religious beliefs signi￿cantly
increase group participation.22 Moreover, higher education of the household head is
positevely associated with group participation while the household wealth index is
positive and signi￿cant, suggesting that joining a group may be a ￿ normal good￿(La
21The wealth index uses principal components analysis (PCA) to assign weights to the indicator.
This procedure ￿rst standardizes the indicator variables (assets ownership and dwelling conditions);
then the factor coe¢ cient scores (or factor "loadings") are calculated using the ￿rst component of a
PCA analysis; and ￿nally, for each household, the indicator values (or asset ownership) are multiplied
by the "loadings" and summed to produce the household￿ s wealth index. In this process, only the
￿rst of the factors produced is used to represent the wealth index. For a complete discussion of the
advantage and disadvantes of asset and wealth index under pca procedures see Filmer and Pritchett
(2001).
22Basic statistics show a relative majority of Changana ethno-linguistic group in our sample fol-
lowed by Ronga, Chope and other groups (see Table A.1 in the Appendix). As for religion, the
majority of people are either Catholic or believe in traditional Spirtism.
15Ferrara 2000). Concerning community level characteristics, many of them do not re-
veal to be signi￿cant with the exception of living in a community with an elementary
school, which is positively and signi￿cantly associated to social capital.23 In Column
3 we ￿nally use a community ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation and results are consistent
in showing that, even within communities, household migration exposure remains
negatively associated to social networks whilst remittances generates a statistically
signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on group participation and social capital investment at
origin.
As mentioned above, though, informal cooperation is an multifacet asset that
may be de￿ned (and measured) in di⁄erent ways. Moreover, the e⁄ect of migration
and remittances on group participation may be the result of a supply side e⁄ect,
in that communities with more migrants (richer communities) may develop more
institutionalized groups and associations (see also Miguel at al. 2006, La Ferrara
2000).24 Similarly, it may be the case that migrant households may form a coalition
or ￿ clubs￿that exclude non-migrant members of society. Thus, in order to control
for these issues, we regress the same models as above using di⁄erent measures of
inter-household cooperation through informal social networks.
In Table 8 we report results from the community ￿xed e⁄ects speci￿cation where
the dependent variables are (i) a dummy variable equal to 1 if any member of the
household is in contact, by daily talks, with any relevant person in the community (i.e.
traditional commuity leader, elected village chief, school teacher, doctor/￿ curandeiro￿ ,
agricultural agent, friends and neighbours); (ii) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
household exchanges (i.e. give or receive) any good or service with at least one rele-
vant person in the community, as above; and (iii) a binary variable equal to 1 if the
household reports expenditure for festivals, ceremonies or funerals within its commu-
nity. The latter variable is another proxy variable for informal social arrangements
and underlying social connections within the community of residence. We ￿nd that
migration and remittance indicators have patterns broadly similar to group member-
ship behavior - even though the migration result is weaker - with the exception of
daily contact networks. They suggest that main results (especially remittances) are
robust to alternative de￿nitions of social arrangements that provide some individual
or collective economic bene￿t, i.e. more in terms of exchange of goods and services
rather than information sharing (see marginal e⁄ects from probit model regressions
in Table A.3). It is worth noting that the wealth e⁄ect in this case is not so strong
and robust in increasing the household incentive to participate in informal exchanges
23Some community characteristics are not signi￿cant but the sign is consistent with expectations.
Yet, it should be noted that formal banks and ￿nancial instituions (as well as health care facilities)
are very few and still largely under-developed in Mozambique, as people are not used to manage
medium-large quantity of money.
24As argued in Miguel et al. (2006), community group data may capture relatively formal expres-
sions of social networks.It is also possible that migration-driven modernization is associated with a
shift toward formal forms of cooperation, but not considerable changes in underlying social networks.
16with nonfamily community members.
In order to explore whether migrant-sending households give or receive more (or
both, through mutual help) from the interaction with other community members, in
Table 9 we report results on the ￿ direction￿of the exchange link. Estimates show
no clear dominant direction in the informal exchange pattern (a slightly bigger co-
e¢ cient for the ￿ giving￿variable) as households receiving remittances are positively
associated with all directions of the exchange link. This is consistent with the idea
that remittances, as as stable source of income, may allow migrant-sending households
to overcome both commitment and enforcement constraints on informal contracts.25
-Table 8 about here-
-Table 9 about here
Finally, we also test whether past housheold migration experience has any e⁄ect
on social capital investment. Table 10 reports linear probability model regressions as
above where the main explanatory variable is whether there is any return migrant
in the household. Findings show that the latter household status, which entails the
return of both human and physical capital after international migration, has a positve
e⁄ect on any form of community based social networks.
-Table 10 about here
Overall, reduced form results seem to suggest that out-migration in a poor devel-
oping setting such as Southern Mozambique is likely to contribute to inter-household
informal arrangements and cooperation through remittances or by returning home,
even though dispatching family labor abroad might tighten the constraint on engag-
ing in social interactions. However, the direction of causal nexus is one of particularly
di¢ cult points of the social capital and migration literatures (Durlauf, 2002, Munshi
2003). As we mentioned above, unobservable determinants of both the household de-
cision to join social networks and to have a migrant member ￿such as idiosyncratic
shocks or household implicit propensity for speci￿c types of (social) arrangement
￿are still unlikely to provide consistent estimates. Furthermore, and most impor-
tantly, a simultaneity bias would be present. Having more social networks at home
may increase the probability to migrate, and thereby to receive remittances, and bias
our reduced form estimates in a positive direction. More access to resources due to
social networks could also increase household well-being, enabling family members
either to send migrants abroad or to forego migration and stay put. On the other
hand, families are likely to allocate more or less resources to informal social arreng-
ments depending on the achievement of speci￿c migrant members or may vary their
25Migrant-sending households may improve allocative e¢ ciency by removing or relaxing some of
the impediments that limit informal exchange - i.e. they use remittances as a committment device
and make credible enforcable contracts.
17resources in response to changes in their migration circumstances (e.g.remittance re-
ceipt). If international migration requires ￿xed up-front costs, an increase in house-
hold resources would increase the migration likelyhood among initially non-migrant
households, and our reduced form coe¢ cients would be downward biased. Overall,
the estimation reported so far would be biased and inconsistent in the event that
migration and remittance are endogeous. Thus, to try to correct for this possibiity
and reveal the ￿ true￿relatioship between household migration exposure and social
networks, using an appropriate IV strategy is required. To this we now turn.
5.1 IV results
In order to address the causal impact of migration and remittances on social network
participation in households left behind, we estimate the system of eqs. (3) using an
instrumental variable strategy. The set of variables to identify migration is whether
the household had a migrant before the war (1984-1992) as well as the number of
household members between 20 and 30 years old in 2005. The former variable is a
proxy for family migration networks, which are related to the pre-war time and do
not a⁄ect the current level social capital, unless via migration status. This is so as
the armed prolonged war largely destroyed existing social networks and massively
displaced refugees and returnees.26 We futher use the number of household members
in their working/migration age (i.e. between 20 and 30 years old) in 2005, as in that
year a free-visa agreement was reached between South Africa and Mozambique. Thus
we argue that, given our household demographic controls, the speci￿c age composition
at the time of the exogenous migration-policy ￿ shock￿occurred in South Africa is
randomly assigned and does not a⁄ect networks in Mozambique beyond its in￿ uence
through migration out-￿ ows.27
In order to identify the remittance equation, we use the short-run deviation in
rainfall levels, measured as rainfall in 2007 minus the average historical rainfall since
1979.28 This is so as variations in rainfall may have a negative impact on households￿
income (strongly dependendent on rain-fed agriculture) and increase the likelihood
to receive remittances. On the other hand, it is unlikely that short-run shocks to the
whole community will a⁄ect household membership in social networks directly and
immediately (as everybody is a⁄ected in the same way) unless making remittance re-
ceipt for migrant-sending housheold more likely.29 We further use whether household
26See section on Mozambican context above. It should be noted that given remittances any indi-
vidual charateristic of migrants before the war is orthogonal to social network participation as the
latter is a property of the household (and not of the individuals who migrated).
27In 2005 Mozambique and South Africa agreed to visa-free travel for their nationals￿consistently
with the new, high-level political vision of South Africa as part of an integrated region. This is an
exogenous migration-policy shock that, interacted with a restricted household age structure, is likely
to a⁄ect networks in Mozambique only via migration out￿ ows.
28Rainfall data source is the NASA GPCP (Global Precipitation Climatology Project) which has
been used by Miguel et al. (2004) among others.
29We further use, as in Munshi 2003, recent-past rainfall levels at the community level obtaining
18migrants have a permanent job-contract at destination and the number of migrants
in the rest of the community sending remittances home as other instruments. The
rationale for including the former variable lies in the fact that migrants￿employment
conditions at destination are a function of labour market characteristics abroad and
thereby may be related to social networks at home only through remittances behav-
ior; the average remittance rate at community level, instead, is very common in the
literature and is a proxy for the local ￿ remittance norm￿(see Rozelle et al.1999, Tay-
lor et al. 2003). The F-statistics of excluded instruments and the overidenti￿cation
Sargan test suggest that the instruments are not weak and valid.
Results based on the IV estimation strategy are presented in Table 11. We both
use 2 stage-least-squares (sls) and 3sls estimators- where the latter applies an IV pro-
cedure to produce consistent estimates and generalised least squares to account for
correlation structure in the disturbances across equations. The explanatory variables
included in the equation of group participation report the expected sign. In particu-
lar, the number of household migrants has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on household
participation in community networks. On the other hand, there is an o⁄setting sig-
ni￿cant e⁄ect of remittance receipt that positively in￿ uences the propensity to join
groups and social networks in households left behind. The di⁄erence in coe¢ cients￿
magnitude, which are higher in the IV regressions than in reduced form linear proba-
bility models, suggest that correcting for endogeneity does have an e⁄ect in revealing
the causal relationship. In particular, if social networks increase the migration like-
lyhood among initially non-migrant households, the reduced form coe¢ cients would
be downward biased.
-Table 11 about here-
We interpret these results as evidence that migration coupled with remittances
is economically and statistically signi￿cant in increasing household memerships in
groups at origin. This is so as remittances are a stable source of income that may
decrease participation costs and increase household commitment in informal social
arrangements in developing settings. Indeed, households with a more stable income
entry can expect to be able to commit themselves more easily to regular payments
in informal exchanges. Thus income stability, through lower risk of default, has
a positive impact on the probability of joining a group. Moreover, certain informal
groups will be more inclined to accept members that have a regular and secure source
of income (i.e. reducing adverse selection problems). That would be an extra e⁄ect
favouring a positive e⁄ect of remittances on the probability of joining.
Yet, membership in groups or informal social arrangements, and the level of en-
forcability, varies with the institutional and legal environment. This is why we futher
same results as using rainfall deviation.
19explore the social impact of household migration exposure in di⁄erent contexts (i.e.
subsamples) where heterogenous degrees of enforcement (e.g. social sanctions) may
be at work.
5.2 Institutional e¢ ciency and heterogenous results
Labor migration from a poor to a richer destination and remittance receipt by people
left behind is a key source of heterogeneity in village economies in developing setting.
Yet, the role of these processes in a⁄ecting the household incentive to participate in
reciprocal informal arrangements at origin may be at work through further e⁄ects,
related to changes in community level institutions and socio-economic characteristics.
The existing literature has pointed out the importance of the community institutional
e¢ ciency in shaping cooperative behavior. In particular, more heterogenous societies
may hamper cooperation in the provision of local public goods and informal exchange
arrangements in that social sanctions are less e⁄ective (or alternatively said, trust
and norms are weaker in more heterogeneous societies)30. Overall the existing ￿nd-
ings indicate that heterogeneity along economic, religious or ethnic lines is correlated
with lower contributions to public goods, higher extraction levels from common re-
sources and poorer maintenance of common infrastructure (e.g. Baland et al. 2001,
Bardhan, 2000). Thus, even though we do not tackle these mechanisms directly, we
rule out confounding factors by carrying out a sensitivity analysis of our results in
the Mozambican context.
Table 12 presents our estimates for a set of sub-samples de￿ned by observable
community attributes correlated with both household migration status and the level
of ￿ cohesion￿at community level. Hence, we distinguish heterogenous communities by
(i) wealth inequality (reported by the community leader and measured with the Gini
coe¢ cient), (ii) the way land is allocated (traditional vs modern law)31, (iii) ethnolin-
guistic and religious diversity.32 As the latter is concerned we build an index of ethinc
(religion) fractionalization that is the probability that two randomly selected individ-
uals from a community will not belong to the same group (see Alesina and LaFerrara
2000, LaFerrara, 2002 and Peri and Ottavianno, 2006 among others). Speci￿cally,
we use the variable "ethnic (religious) group" to de￿ne the cultural identity of each
30It is hypothesized that homogeneity at community level increases trust and common norms and
lowers information and monitoring costs, such that it encourages social exchanges. See Alesina et al.
1999, Alesina and La Ferrara 2000, Bandiera et al. 2005.
31As other regions in Africa, Mozambique is a country of relatively low densities of population with
strong cultural traditions and respected local authorities who, in the absence of o¢ cial authorities,
are in charge solve con￿ icts and allocate land -often (but not always) jointly with the community
council- using indigenous knowledge and local capacity.
32Mozambique is peculiar in terms of diversity, as our data indicate a very low level of ethnic
diversity and a relatively high level of religious diversity.
20household. The fractionalization index is de￿ned as:






j is the share of people of group i among the residents of community j. This
index varies from 0 (perfect homogeneity) to 1 (highest degree of heterogeneity or
fragmentation).
-Table 12 about here-
As shown in Panel A in Table 12, migration and especially the remittance e⁄ect is
more precisely estimated in communities with lower level of inequality, both reported
by the community leader (subjective measure) or measured with the Gini index (in
the latter case we consider communities in the top two and bottom two quantiles
of the Gini index distribution). When we distinguish communities where land is
allocated by the leader, the goverment or the whole community through participatory
meetings (Panel B), results show that remittances are relevant for group participation
in societies with traditional land allocation rules, and even negatively associated with
group participation where modern law holds (yet in the latter case variation is too
low to reach stable conclusions as most of communities follow traditional patterns of
land allocation). Finally, migrant-sending households do not appear to respond very
di⁄erentlly according to the social composition of the community, when the latter is
measured in terms of ethnic or religious fractionalization (also in this case we consider
communities in the top two and bottom two quantiles of the fractionalization indexes
distribution). In particular, migrant-sending households appear to participate in
the same way in both ethnically homogeneous and heterogeous communities, and
even slighlty more in communities with more religious diversity. We interpret these
results as evidence that economically homogenous societies may be more e⁄ective
in devising mechanims, related to egalitarian rules or social sanctions, that foster
cooperative behavior in migrant-sending households. This is not the case, though,
when communities are homogenous in their ethnic or religious composition. The
latter may be explained by the little hystory of religious fundamentalism or ethnic
con￿ ict in Southern Mozambique, and therefore by the little relevance of ethnicity or
religion in determining heterogenous preferences on the provision and characteristics
of common goods.33
33Mozambicans often identify primarily with the ethnic and/or linguistic group. However, the
independence movement that began in the 1960s was a unifying force, causing disparate elements
to join together in resisting the Portuguese. Ironically, some of the main unifying factors in the
country have been remnants of the colonial system, including the Portuguese language and the
Roman Catholic religion. Thus, despite ethnic and linguistic di⁄erences, there is little con￿ ict among
the various groups. The greatest cultural disparities are those which divide the north of the country
from the south.
216 Conclusions
This paper examines the role of labor migration and remittances in shaping group
participation and social networks in village economies left behind. By using an orig-
inal household survey containing detailed information on family migration status,
group participation and inter-household informal exchanges from two regions in the
south of Mozambique, we ￿nd that households with successful migrants, i.e. those
receiving remittances or return migration, engage more in community based social
networks. In particular, contrary to the common presumption, we ￿nd that the
probability of a family engaging in a social network is decreasing in the number of
migrants but increasing in an indicator for receipt of remittances. The former result
is weaker when informal social arrangements are considered, while the latter ￿nding
is robust to alternative de￿nitions of social interaction, to the introduction of com-
munity ￿xed e⁄ects, and to potential endogeneity issues, which we address with an
instrumental-variable estimation strategy. The same positive result holds when we
look at the compound e⁄ect of return migration on social networks participation.
We interpret these results as evidence that in a poor developing setting, even though
social networks are open, income risk and participation constraints may limit both
access to them and their e⁄ectiveness in facilitating inter-household cooperation and
trade. Thus, higher income stability through remittances or strong family migra-
tion ties may decrease participation costs and increase household commitement in
engaging in groups and reciprocal arrangements.
We also explore the role of the institutional and social enviroment in driving group
participation of migrant-sending households in more homogeneous communities. We
￿nd that migrant households in Southern Mozambique are more likely to engage
in social networks and cooperation in more economically even societies, where social
cohesion and sanctions may be more e⁄ective, whilst they are not unevenly responsive
to the social composition of the community in terms of ethnicity or religion.
Our results contribute to the existing migration literature by providing new in-
sights into how labor mobility, as a common within-family strategy in many devel-
oping countries, a⁄ect the informal structure of village economies at origin. This is
even more relevant when considering the wide literature showing the key role played
by social capital and networks in shaping economic development and institutions in
low income countries. Thus, labor out-migration may have a positive e⁄ect on the
social structure and the organization of the common duties in local communities at
origin, through the enduring ties that migrants maintain with their home country.
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N. of current migrants in the HH 1.59 (1.18)
HH with migration experience 55% (0.5)
HH with current migrants 38% (0.49)
HH receiving remittances (total) 24% (0.43)
HH receiving remittances (out of migrant HHs) 60% (0.49)
N. of return migrants in the HH 1.29 (0.68)
HH with returm migrants 29% (0.45)





Current migrants Return migrants Never migrants
Gender (male) 82% 67% 43%
Age in years 30.64 38.41 23.34
Married/cohabit 52% 62% 38%
HH size 5.08 5.52 6.34
Literate 80% 69% 55%
Years of education 5.21 4.60 4.09
English speaker 27% 20% 5%
HH head no education 45% 34% 43%
HH head primary education 48% 54% 45%
HH head secondary or more education 7% 13% 12%
No religion 10% 10% 11%
Occupation (a)
Farmer (work on own land) 2% 27% 22%
Farm worker 2% 7% 2%
Non-farm worker 39% 14% 7%
Self-employed 6% 7% 5%
Informal worker 17% 10% 4%
Student 3% 6% 34%
Domestic activities 3% 7% 11%
Unemployed 2% 5% 6%
Retired 0% 6% 1%
Other 8% 9% 5%
Country of destination:
South Africa 98% 90% -
Other African countries 2% 8% -
Other (EU, US) 1% 1% -
NS/NR 0% 0% -
Migration spell from last migration 3.85 9.52 -
Migration spell from first migration 9.44 14.99 -
Migration spell from return - 0.92 -
Wish to migrate again - 58% -
Send remittances 45% -
(a) This is current occupation of return migrants at home and occupation of current migrants at destination.













Food consumption  86% (0.34)
Housing 3% (0.16)
Health 3% (0.17)
Investment in own business 1% (0.10)
Clothing 2% (0.13)
Other 6% (0.06)
Way to send 
Personally 20% (0.4)
Friends or collegues 24% (0.43)
Taxi 33% (0.47)
Public transport/ mochibombo 7% (0.1)
Bank account (teba) 4% (0.19)
Postal mail 3% (0.17)
Other 9% (0.12)






Participation in any group (dummy) 27% 0.45
By type
ROSCAs (rotating saving and credit groups) 6% 0.23
Farmers cooperative association 3% 0.18
Bank group 4% 0.19
Civic committees (a) 2% 0.19
Burials' association 1% 0.11
Self-help religious/church group 14% 0.34
Women group 2% 0.11
Youth group 1% 0.10
Other groups (b) 2% 0.12
Type of participation
Member 25% 0.43
Beneficiary  17% 0.37
Decision maker 13% 0.33
Promotor 11% 0.31
Informal social interaction
Daily talk with any important person 74% 0.43
Give or receive (any good or service) 27% 0.44
Expenses on ceremonies 14% 0.34
Direction of the social exchange
Receive 18% 0.38
Give 14% 0.35
Give and Receive (mutual help) 5% 0:21
Social network participation (household level)
Notes: (a) Civic committees include both participation in meettings and voluntary labor
exchage to improve community infrastructures. (b) Other groups includes: associations of
"mukhero", cooperatives of productors, unions, ONG's activities, agricultural voluntary
labor.  Table 5
Reasons for not to participate in social networks (a)
Lack of money Lack of time Lack of interest/trust
Formal groups
ROSCAs (xitique) 31% 28% 30%
Farmers cooperative association 34% 34% 25%
Political group 35% 34% 21%
Bank group 30% 28% 30%
Civic committees (b) 33% 34% 24%
Burials' association 34% 34% 25%
Self-help religious/church group 30% 27% 26%
Women group 34% 34% 21%
Youth group 37% 35% 22%
Other groups (c) 32% 36% 23%
Informal social interaction
Community leader 8% 26% 57%
Goverment authority 16% 15% 59%
Teacher 9% 29% 48%
Farming agent 21% 21% 41%
Priest 15% 20% 45%
Neighbours 11% 17% 63%
Health provider 20% 15% 53%
Healer 14% 10% 41%
Employer 21% 24% 38%
Notes: (a) The question posed in the questionnaire was: why did you or any member of your family not participate in [....] or
exchange resources with [...]? The alternative answers were: (i) no need, (ii) does not work, (iii) no trust, (iv) no useful, (v) too
costly, (vi) too time consuming. (b) Civic committees include bothn participation on meetting and voluntary labor to improve
community infrastructure. (c) Other groups includes: associations of "mukhero", cooperatives of productors, unions, ONG's
activities, agricultural voluntary labor.  
 
 Table 6
No Yes No Yes No  Yes
HH with int.migration experience 53% 60% 52% 62% 51% 76%
HH receives remittances 23% 28% 20% 37% 22% 41%
Female HH head 40% 38% 40% 37% 39% 40%
Age of HH head 46.56 45.48 46.31 46.16 46.5 44.87
Head no education 46% 33% 42% 42% 43% 37%
HH head education- primary 47% 44% 45% 50% 46% 49%
HH head education- secondary or more 7% 22% 12% 8% 11% 14%
HH head occupation- farmer 42% 45% 42% 46% 41% 57%
Household size  4.83 5.57 5.06 4.95 4.87 6.03
N. of females in the HH 2.88 3 2.94 2.84 2.81 3.53
N. of children in the HH (<5years-old) 0.65 0.86 0.67 0.81 0.65 1.1
Residence 5 or more years (dummy) 84% 88% 84% 89% 85% 84%
Ethnicity-changana 90% 72% 86% 82% 86% 79%
Ethnicity-Ronga 8% 18% 10% 13% 11% 11%
Ethnicity-Chope 1% 3% 1% 2% 1% 4%
Ethnicity-Other minorities 1% 7% 3% 3% 2% 5%
No religion 12% 7% 11% 10% 12% 4%
Wealth index -0.41 0.56 -0.2 0 -0.27 0.61
Urban area 17% 38% 23% 21% 20% 36%
Community characteristics
Ethnic fractionalization index 0.18 0.27 0.2 0.23 0.21 0.18
Religion fractionalizaiton index 0.66 0.6 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.63
Community with pave-road 13% 20% 18% 8% 14% 22%
Community with elementary school 75% 80% 81% 65% 80% 58%
Community with a Bank 3% 12% 7% 2% 5% 7%
Community with a market 42% 43% 49% 27% 42% 46%
No Yes No Yes No  Yes
Formal Group participation  29% 26% 26% 32% 22% 40%
Informal exchange (give or receive) 26% 30% 23% 41% 24% 35%
Expenses in cerimonies 13% 17% 11% 24% 10% 25%
Mutual help (give and receive) 4% 6% 3% 11% 4% 8%
Household and community characteristics by social network categories and migration status (household level)
Notes: (a) Formal group is a binary variable equal to 1 if any member of the household has participated in any of the following formal groups: ROSCAs, bank,
farmers association, burials association, ONGs actions, self-help religious group, political group, women group, civic group, migrant's group, young group, others.
(b) Give or receive a binary viariable equal to 1 if the HH has given or received products or services in the last month from at least one of the following important
persons in the community: traditional leader, elected leader, teacher, agricultural agent, priest, neighbours, health provider, healer, employer. (c) Expenses in
ceremonies is a binary variable equal to 1 if the HH spent any money or product in community's ceremonies in the last year. 
Panel A
Panel B
Current Migration Remittances Return Migration




Linear probability models (standard errors in brackets)
(1) (2) (3)
N. of current migrants in the HH -0.047** -0.039** -0.035**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
HH receives remittances 0.120*** 0.146*** 0.153***
(0.043) (0.048) (0.039)
Female HH head 0.038 0.047
(0.041) (0.031)
Age of HH head 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.004)
Age of HH head squared -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
HH head education- primary 0.021 0.011
(0.036) (0.033)
HH head education- secondary or more 0.252*** 0.236***
(0.064) (0.054)
HH head occupation- farmer 0.069* 0.088***
(0.039) (0.031)
HH operating land 0.023 0.015
(0.048) (0.039)
HH size 0.014 0.007
(0.009) (0.009)
N. of females in the HH -0.039*** -0.036***
(0.010) (0.013)
N. of children in the HH (<5years-old) 0.049* 0.047**
(0.026) (0.020)






















Religion-Tradition spiritsm 0.108** 0.090*
(0.051) (0.047)
Religion (NS/NR) -0.112*** -0.021
(0.039) (0.062)
Wealth index 0.030*** 0.020**
(0.009) (0.009)
Urban area (dummy) 0.167*** 0.371
(0.059) (0.333)
Community with paved-road -0.060
(0.088)
Community with primary school 0.116**
(0.051)
Community with a Bank -0.009
(0.099)
Community with a market -0.052
(0.090)
Community with health facility 0.058
(0.095)
Constant 0.273*** -0.156 -0.113
(0.049) (0.120) (0.133)
Obs. 905 905 905
R-squared 0.012 0.220 0.127
N. of community fixed effects 42
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Impact of migration and remittances on group participation 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable is a binary variable equal to 1 if any member of the household has participated in any of the following
groups: ROSCAs, farmers' association, burials association, ONGs actions, self-help religious group, political group, women group, civic group,
youth group, others. (b) Remittances variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the HH has received remittances, in money or in-kind, in the last year.
(c) Wealth index is the first component of a principal component analysis, which uses dwelling conditions and assets ownership of the HH. (d) 
Column 3 shows estimates with fixed effects at the community level. The excluded categories are: no education, Changana, no religion.  Table 8
Linear probability models (standard errors in brackets)
Daily talk 
frequency
Give or receive (a)
Expenses on 
ceremonies (b) 
N. of current migrants in the HH -0.014 -0.026 -0.005
(0.017) (0.016) (0.013)
HH receives remittances  0.020 0.139*** 0.055*
(0.043) (0.040) (0.033)
Female HH head -0.030 0.029 0.019
(0.033) (0.031) (0.026)
Age of HH head 0.001 -0.001 -0.007**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Age of HH head squared -0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH head education- primary -0.074** 0.009 -0.012
(0.036) (0.034) (0.028)
HH head education- secondary or more -0.083 0.009 -0.064
(0.059) (0.056) (0.045)
HH head occupation- farmer 0.101*** 0.036 0.070***
(0.033) (0.032) (0.026)
HH operating land 0.062 0.021 0.009
(0.042) (0.040) (0.033)
HHsize -0.022** 0.002 0.016**
(0.010) (0.009) (0.007)
N. of females in the HH 0.023* -0.017 -0.026**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.011)
N. of children in the HH (<5years-old) 0.034 0.024 0.035**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016)
Residence 5 or more years (dummy) -0.032 0.080* 0.004
(0.044) (0.042) (0.034)
Ethnicity-Ronga 0.159*** 0.080 0.017
(0.055) (0.052) (0.042)
Ethnicity-Chope 0.295** 0.071 0.194*
(0.132) (0.125) (0.102)
Ethnicity-Other minorities 0.049 0.199** 0.100
(0.095) (0.090) (0.074)
Religion-Catholic -0.032 0.029 0.005
(0.060) (0.057) (0.046)
Religion-Presbyterian -0.191* -0.019 -0.072
(0.101) (0.095) (0.077)
Religion-Methodist -0.144* 0.013 0.132**
(0.086) (0.081) (0.066)
Religion-Anglican -0.201 -0.327** -0.104
(0.174) (0.165) (0.134)
Religion-Baptist -0.269** -0.186 -0.147
(0.136) (0.129) (0.105)
Religion-Adventist -0.255** -0.306** 0.269***
(0.128) (0.121) (0.098)
Religion-Islam 0.121 -0.137 -0.117
(0.156) (0.148) (0.120)
Religion-Tradition spiritsm -0.090* 0.028 -0.004
(0.051) (0.049) (0.039)
Religion (NS/NR) -0.157** 0.010 0.012
(0.067) (0.063) (0.051)
Wealth index 0.000 -0.006 0.015**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007)
Urban area 0.056 -0.131 0.232
(0.360) (0.341) (0.278)
Constant 0.813*** 0.189 0.205*
(0.144) (0.136) (0.111)
Observations 905 905 905
R-squared 0.064 0.057 0.083
N. of community fixed effects 42 42 42
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Impact of migration and remittances on informal social interaction (c) 
Notes: (a) Give or receive is a binary viariable equal to 1 if the household exchanged (i.e. give or receive) any good or service with any important person
in the community in the last month, i.e. with the traditional leader, elected leader, teacher, agricultural agent, priest, neighbors, health provider, healer,
employer.  (b) Expenses in ceremonies is a binary variable equal to 1 if the HH has espent money or goods on community ceremonies in the last year. (c) 
All regressions use fixed effects at the community level. The excluded categories are: no education, Changana, no religion.   
 Table 9
Impact on the Direction of informal social inrections
Linear probability models (standard errors in brackets)
Give Receive
Give & receive  
(mutual help)
N. of current migrants in the HH -0.032** -0.015 -0.021**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.008)
HH receives remittances 0.127*** 0.092*** 0.080***
(0.035) (0.031) (0.021)
HH and community Controls no yes yes
Community fixed effects (42) no no yes
Obs. 905 905 905
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: (a) Give (receive) is a binary viariable equal to 1 if the HH gave without receiving (received without giving) any
good or service to any important person in the community in the last month, i.e. with the traditional leader, elected leader,
teacher, agricultural agent, priest, neighbors, health provider, healer, employer. (b) Give&Received (mutual help) is a
binary variable equal to 1 if the HH exchanged something (gave&received) with any important person in the community.
(c) All regressions use fixed effects at the community level. The excluded categories are: no education, Changana, no
religion.   
 Table 10










Give & receive  
(mutual help) (b)
Return migration (c)  0.058*** -0.023 0.064*** 0.073*** 0.088*** 0.020 0.044***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.011)
Female HH head 0.062** -0.030 0.043 0.009 0.049* -0.005 0.001
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.016)
Age of HH head 0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Age of HH head squared -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
HH head education- primary 0.016 -0.072** 0.012 -0.042 0.051* -0.017 0.021
(0.033) (0.036) (0.034) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.017)
HH head education- secondary or more 0.248*** -0.081 0.019 -0.007 0.011 -0.023 -0.031
(0.054) (0.058) (0.055) (0.045) (0.048) (0.043) (0.028)
HH head occupation- farmer 0.080*** 0.102*** 0.028 0.086*** 0.027 0.020 0.019
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.016)
HH operating land 0.020 0.065 0.025 0.012 0.030 0.005 0.010
(0.039) (0.042) (0.040) (0.032) (0.034) (0.031) (0.021)
HHsize 0.006 -0.021** 0.000 0.008 -0.003 0.001 -0.002
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
N. of females in the HH -0.036*** 0.020 -0.016 -0.011 -0.016 -0.007 -0.006
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.006)
N. of children in the HH (<5years-old) 0.056*** 0.035* 0.033* 0.049*** 0.014 0.022 0.003
(0.019) (0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.010)
Residence 5 or more years (dummy) 0.086** -0.035 0.100** 0.018 0.076** 0.044 0.021
(0.041) (0.044) (0.042) (0.033) (0.036) (0.032) (0.021)
Ethnicity-Ronga 0.145*** 0.161*** 0.070 0.041 -0.022 0.130*** 0.037
(0.051) (0.055) (0.052) (0.042) (0.044) (0.040) (0.026)
Ethnicity-Chope 0.235* 0.283** 0.127 0.268*** 0.269** 0.062 0.204***
(0.123) (0.132) (0.125) (0.101) (0.107) (0.096) (0.064)
Ethnicity-Other minorities 0.227** 0.040 0.239*** 0.151** 0.142* 0.180** 0.083*
(0.089) (0.096) (0.091) (0.073) (0.078) (0.070) (0.047)
Religion-Catholic 0.061 -0.032 0.023 -0.035 0.012 0.040 0.029
(0.056) (0.060) (0.057) (0.046) (0.049) (0.044) (0.029)
Religion-Presbyterian -0.042 -0.195* -0.032 0.060 -0.156* 0.138* 0.014
(0.093) (0.100) (0.095) (0.076) (0.081) (0.073) (0.049)
Religion-Methodist 0.197** -0.135 -0.022 0.128** -0.039 0.030 0.013
(0.079) (0.085) (0.081) (0.065) (0.069) (0.062) (0.041)
Religion-Anglican 0.008 -0.207 -0.351** -0.088 -0.042 -0.284** 0.025
(0.161) (0.174) (0.165) (0.133) (0.141) (0.127) (0.084)
Religion-Baptist 0.075 -0.290** -0.205 -0.146 -0.108 -0.048 0.049
(0.126) (0.135) (0.128) (0.103) (0.110) (0.099) (0.066)
Religion-Adventist 0.150 -0.244* -0.362*** 0.262*** -0.110 -0.264*** -0.012
(0.119) (0.128) (0.121) (0.098) (0.104) (0.093) (0.062)
Religion-Islam -0.065 0.121 -0.165 -0.087 -0.185 -0.053 -0.073
(0.145) (0.156) (0.148) (0.119) (0.127) (0.114) (0.076)
Religion-Tradition spiritsm 0.069 -0.090* 0.008 -0.007 -0.001 0.025 0.016
(0.047) (0.051) (0.049) (0.039) (0.042) (0.037) (0.025)
Religion (NS/NR) -0.029 -0.158** 0.003 -0.009 -0.042 0.049 0.004
(0.062) (0.067) (0.063) (0.051) (0.054) (0.049) (0.032)
Wealth index 0.019** 0.001 -0.006 0.018** -0.001 -0.006 -0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004)
Urban area 0.386 0.057 -0.119 0.038 -0.048 -0.142 -0.072
(0.334) (0.360) (0.342) (0.275) (0.293) (0.263) (0.174)
Constant -0.101 0.819*** 0.198 0.018 0.112 0.113 0.027
(0.133) (0.144) (0.136) (0.110) (0.117) (0.105) (0.070)
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905 905
R-squared 0.119 0.065 0.055 0.118 0.067 0.052 0.051
N. of community fixed effects 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Impact of return migration on group participation and informal social interactions (c) (d) 
Notes: (a) Formal group is defined as in table 7. (b) Give and receive (mutual help), give or receive and expenses on ceremonies are defined as in table 8 and 9. (c) Return migration is the N. of HH members,














IV regression estimates of the impact of migration and remittances on group participation






Number of current migrants in the HH -0.231** -0.272*** -0.219*** -0.293***
(0.099) (0.098) (0.070) (0.085)
HH receives remittances 0.785** 0.771** 0.954*** 1.324***
(0.398) (0.375) (0.282) (0.357)
HH and community Controls  yes yes yes yes
Observations 905 905 905 905
Overid. Sargan test (Chi-sq.)
P-value
First stage results of 3sls
Migration Remittances Migration Remittances




Short-run rainfall deviation 2.907*
(1.468)
Permanent jobc ontract of migrants 0.119**
(0.045)
Community remittances rate 0.006***
(0.002)
Joint  F-test  73.31 4.31 73.31 5.43
P-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Joint  F-test on all instr. (2lsls results) 49.04 20.67 36.2 9.75
P-value 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
1.627 4.402
Dep. Variable
Notes: (1) and (2) Instruments include migration experience before war, the number of household members beween 20 and 30 years old in 2005, short-run rainfall deviation 
(measured as rainfall in 2007 minus the average historical rainfall since 1979) and whether household migrant members have a permanent job contract at destination. (3) and 
(4) replace the latter instrument with the remittances rate in the community of residence. (a) All instruments for each endogenous variable are excluded. (b) Two different 






Impact of migration and remittances on group participation by heterogeneous communities
Linear probability models (standard errors in brackets)
Low High Low  High
N. of current migrants in the HH 0.004 -0.026 -0.047** -0.019
(0.027) (0.030) (0.019) (0.030)
HH receives remittances 0.158*** 0.070 0.184*** 0.095
(0.061) (0.064) (0.053) (0.062)
Fixed effects
Observations 398 333 465 440
R-squared 0.186 0.193 0.189 0.144
N. of communities 18 16 23 19






Low High Low  High
N. of current migrants in the HH -0.023 -0.051 -0.037 -0.053**
(0.023) (0.034) (0.026) (0.022)
HH receives remittances  0.136** 0.146* 0.105 0.096**
(0.057) (0.083) (0.076) (0.039)
Controls included yes yes yes yes
Fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Observations 342 365 368 351
R-squared 0.185 0.148 0.184 0.230
N. of communities 17 16 16 18
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Notes: (a) Objective Inequality is measured with the Gini coefficient of the wealth index at the community level- we use the two first quantiles of the wealth 
distribution for equal communities and the last two quantiles for inequal ones (b) Subjective Inequality is a binary variable equal to 1 if the community leader reports 
that altmost all community members have the same linving standards (equal) and 0 if he reports large differences among people (inequality). (c) Dummy vars. how 
the land is allocated in the community, reported in the community questionnaire: either by the community leader or community councils (traditional law) or by the 
government (modern law). (d) Ethnic and religion fractionalization indexes measuring community diversity (when equal to 1 the community is completely 








Ethnic fractionalization index (d) Religion fractionalization index (d)



















Summary statistics at household level
Mean s.d.
Number of current migrants in the HH 1.59 (1.18)
HH receives remittances 24% (0.43)
Female HH head 39% (0.49)
Age of HH head 46.27 (17.5)
HH head education- primary 46% (0.5)
HH head education- secondary or more 11% (0.31)
HH head occupation- farmer 43% (0.5)
HH operating land 79% (0.41)
HHsize 5.03 (2.87)
Number of females in the HH 2.91 (1.89)
Number of children in the HH (<5years-old) 0.71 (0.88)
Residence 5 or more years (dummy) 85% (0.36)
Ethnicity-Ronga 11% (0.31)
Ethnicity-Chope 1% (0.11)








Religion-Tradition spiritsm 48% (0.5)
Religion (NS/NR) 12% (0.32)
Wealth index -0.14 (2.13)
Urban area 22% (0.42)
Community with paved-road 15% (0.36)
Community with primary school 77% (0.42)
Community with a Bank 6% (0.23)
Community with a market 43% (0.49)
Health service provider 27% (0.45)  
 Table A.2
Probit Marginal effects (standard errors in brackets)
1 2 3 (b)
N. of current migrants in the HH -0.056** -0.048** -0.040*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.021)
HH receives remittances 0.135*** 0.178*** 0.193***
(0.048) (0.065) (0.062)
Female HH head 0.052 0.058
(0.044) (0.039)
Age of HH head 0.004 0.005
(0.007) (0.006)
Age of HH head squared -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
HH head education- primary 0.030 0.016
(0.039) (0.042)
HH head education- secondary or more 0.300*** 0.276***
(0.081) (0.093)
HH head occupation- farmer 0.075* 0.096**
(0.043) (0.040)




N. of females in the HH -0.042*** -0.044***
(0.010) (0.015)
N. of children in the HH (<5years-old) 0.049* 0.050**
(0.027) (0.025)




















Religion-Tradition spiritsm 0.132** 0.116*
(0.064) (0.059)
Religion (NS/NR) -0.139*** -0.048
(0.049) (0.076)
Wealth index 0.035*** 0.023**
(0.009) (0.010)
Urban area 0.192*** 0.001
(0.065) (0.113)
Community with paved-road -0.067
(0.094)
Community with primary school 0.123**
(0.052)
Community with a Bank -0.039
(0.093)
Community with a market -0.065
(0.104)
Health service provider 0.065
(0.124)
Observations 905 905 905
N. of communities 42
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Impact of migration and remittances on group participation (a) 
Notes: (a) The dependent variable of all regressions is a binary variable equal to 1 if any member of the household has 
participated in any community group. (b) Column 3 shows estimates with fixed effects at the community level.     
Table A.3








Give & receive  
(mutual help) 
Number of current migrants in the HH -0.021 -0.017 0.001 -0.039** -0.003 -0.010**
(0.019) (0.021) (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005)
HH receives remittances 0.038 0.177*** 0.072* 0.157*** 0.124*** 0.074***
(0.046) (0.055) (0.040) (0.052) (0.044) (0.027)
HH controls included yes yes yes yes yes yes
Community controls included yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 905 905 905 905 905 905
Robust standard errors clustered at community level in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Impact of migration and remittances on informal social interactions 
Notes: (a) All dependent variables are defined as in table 7 and directions. (b) By using probit regressions, some community fixed effects perfectly predict failures,
requiring us to drop many observations from probit regressions. Adjusting the sample for each different regression specification would make it difficult to compare results
across specifications, so that in this table we present probit regressions using our baseline set of community controls instead of fixed effects.  